Voting machines must provide a voter-verifiable audit trail

There is a growing number of nutty suggestions, including in Canada, suggesting that we should move more towards electronic voting. In an ExtremeTech article Techies Protest Purely Electronic Voting we see David Dill, a computer science professor at Stanford University, setting up a website opposing electronic-only voting systems.

I also fully endorse the following resolution:

"Computerized voting equipment is inherently subject to programming error, equipment malfunction, and malicious tampering. It is therefore crucial that voting equipment provide a voter-verifiable audit trail, by which we mean a permanent record of each vote that can be checked for accuracy by the voter before the vote is submitted, and is difficult or impossible to alter after it has been checked. Many of the electronic voting machines being purchased do not satisfy this requirement. Voting machines should not be purchased or used unless they provide a voter-verifiable audit trail; when such machines are already in use, they should be replaced or modified to provide a voter-verifiable audit trail. Providing a voter-verifiable audit trail should be one of the essential requirements for certification of new voting systems."