Read: [next] [previous] message[d@DCC] Draft Chapter 26 of the Manual of Patent Office Practice (MOPOP)From: Russell McOrmond <russell _-at-_ flora.ca> On Fri, 4 Jul 2003, Jason Young wrote: > This cannot be so, for if it were, the mere invention of computers would > have the effect of rendering patentable that which would not have > previously been patentable, and a "new dimension" would have been given > to the Act. In the present case the mental process would not be > patentable by itself; the additional factor of the use of a computer > does not serve to convert it into an "invention" within the meaning of > s. 2. I read a summary of the Schlumberger case in the new draft Chapter 26 of the Manual of Patent Office Practice (MOPOP) http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/sc_mrksv/cipo/patents/mopop/mopop-e.html I was sent this draft chapter that is not yet published on their website as part of the research for my patent report for ICT branch. http://www.flora.ca/patent2003/ Note: I didn't have time to read it to include commentary in my patent report, so I am now publishing this very informal off-the-cuff summary of my reading. If someone has done analysis in this area, or wishes to comment on Canadian software patent policy or my report, please do so at the email address provided at the top of the report. MOPOP details the two-step test to determine patentability: " a) What has been discovered according to the patent applisation? As in any inventive field, this first step is for understanding the discovery as a whole including the claim limitations. b) Is that discovery patentable regardless of whether a computer is or should be used to implement discovery? In order to determine whether the discovery relates to patentable subject matter, the use of a computer to implement the discovery shall not change the determination of the subject matter of the invention." The problem is, I'm also told by multiple sources that pure software patents (discoveries that exist only because of the invention of a computer) are being granted in Canada. I don't have actual patents to reference as I didn't find any online, and I don't want to be tainted by software patents in the course of writing this report. Many of these cases end up having interpretations of the additional words used by the judges, and not just the ruling itself. For instance, the 1981 Diamond v. Diehr decision has wording from the judges to suggest that patentable subject matter in the USA should "include anything under the sun that is made by man." This was then used later to allow business model patents in the USA, and is used by the USTR to try to impose this interpretation worldwide in trade negotiations. My reading of CIPO's MOPOP draft chapter 26 suggests that Canada intends to grant all types of information process patents. This could be because of thinking within CIPO, or it could be because of NAFTA chapter 17 which some legal opinions have suggested impose the "anything under the sun that is made by man" US interpretation of patentable subject matter onto Canada http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/english/nafta/chap-171.htm#A1709 My reading of Chapter 26 is not as a manual for examiners to know how to properly reject information process patents, but as a manual for patent filers to know how to word an unpatentable information process such that it will be interpreted by an examiner to be a patentable invention. If a process can be 'executed' entirely in the mind of a human, no matter how long that process might take (speed of processing should not be a determining factor in patentability), then the subject matter should not be patentable. This should exclude information process patents such as all pure software patents and business method patents. If a patentable manufacturing process happens to contain software, then that should remain patentable as a correct interpretation of patentability. In this case it is not the software that is being patented, but the process as a whole. If information processes from that software are used in a different context (outside of that manufacturing process) then this would not be an infringement on the patent for the manufacturing process. A quick google search turns up the typical analysis from the pro-sw-patent side (Patent lawyers, patent consultants, patent offices, etc) which interpret patent law such that information process patents should be granted. This is similar to the USA where it was not economists, public servants or members of parliament that extended patentable subject matter, but patent offices, patent lawyers and courts (sometimes specialized patent courts). "Obtaining software patents: Canada Now Open for Business" http://www.kmblaw.com/article_07_99softpatents.html "Software Related Patents" http://www.shapirocohen.com/softpatents.htm "Software-Related Patents: Canada" http://www.jurisdiction.com/spcanada.htm http://www.jurisdiction.com/dmc0003.htm I believe the problem is a lack of clarity in the patent act which needs modernization in the face of information process patents, with changes following adequate public policy and economic analysis. This is not an area of public policy that can be left to trade negotiaters, patent offices, or legal opinions of outdated patent acts that could not have anticipated information process patents. I also believe there is a considerable problem with incorrect interpretations in the examiner guidelines about the nature of computer software as an information process. Under 26.05 of the CIPO MOPOP there is a list of claim categories, or (my interpretation) ways of wording claims such that non-patentable information processes appear to be patentable. They have: "26.05.1 : Claiming the process Claims in this category define the process which takes place in the computer when the computer program is run. The claim defines the data and the processing steps which are to be performed on the data. The following process claim defines a way of encrypting data for storage on a card." It then describes a pure software process which should be unpatenable, but they claim that it is patentable. If it is software within an overall process, then a claim is valid. If it is a process that is contained within software, then the claim should be unpatenable. In their example what is inventive is the encryption method which is an information process, not the fact that there is a storage card for the result. Use of the identical software method to store in any other card should be understood as not an infringement of this method, but this is not how such patents are being interpreted. "26.05.2 Claiming the programmed computer A computer which has been configured with a novel computer program is considered to be a different machine from the same computer when programmed in another way. The actions performed in the computer are directed by the computer program. The functional steps in the method claim have been replaced by functional components such as "means for" expressions to define the structural elements of the computer. " Another version of the same pure software claim is given. I can't quite articulate just how offensive I find this section of MOPOP. What they are suggesting is that any 'programming' or 'training' that a computer receives changes the nature of the machine. This is similar to saying that when a student goes to school that they should be issued a new passport after each course as they are no longer the same person. In a philosophical sense there may be a tiny bit of truth to this, but we don't think of a person as a new person when they receive additional knowledge/training and thus should not do this for computers. The existence of a trained person within a manufacturing process does not change the nature of the manufacturing process to make it unpatentable. That person and/or their knowledge does not itself become patentable. There may be non-disclosure agreements signed by an employee in relation to their training, but trade secret and other such laws are quite different from patent law. "26.05.3 Claiming the computer program The third category of claims define a computer readable memory storing statements and instructions for execution by a data processing system to direct the system to function in a particular manner. This type of claim is variously referred to as a computer readable medium claim, software claim, computer product or article of manufacture." This might as well be called the "Microsoft claim", or the claim that if business models similar to those used by manufacturing are used to create/distribute software (Software Manufacturing), that this renders the result patentable as manufacturing. This seems to contradict Schlumberger which suggested that the existence of a computer did not add to or subtract from patentability. If someone claimed an effort to educate/lobby/market/propagandize people into believing a certain thing (a form of training) to be manufacturing (Manufacturing Consent), does that make this social process patentable? It goes on with: 26.05.3.a Computer program on a carrier to take care of the situation where the patentable non-invention is not on a physical medium. 26.05.3.b Computer program on a signal medium This is the web-services claim, that pure software existing on a network without a defined physical medium is claimed as patentable. 26.05.3.c Data structures This is another case where even copyright does not grant a monopoly, but with the right wording you can have a claim granted for a patent. " 26.05.3.d Non-patentable media claims A computer program stored on a computer readable medium does not render the program patentable if the subject matter is otherwise not patentable. For example, data or information such as molecular structure or music does not possess the processing functionality which is required for patentability. These media claims carry only non-functional descriptive material which are not patentable." Given much of the claim to information process patentability exists in the field of philosophy and not science, law or economics, I could easily argue that music is also functional descriptive material. Having a song which causes humans to tap, sing along or change to a certain mood (make them happy, sad, etc) is just as much of a legitimate information process as a computer program/algorithm/etc which causes a computer to do various things. Someone drew an arbitrary line in the sand to try to make computer software seem somehow special or magical as a description of an information process. We end up right back at the nature of what a computer is, what is math, what is applied math/science, what is an invention, what is technical. The key questions is whether any form of expression of an information process (training, education, computer software) whether in spoken languages (english), in music or in a computer language (C, C++, C#) should be granted a monopoly by an act of parliament that appears intended only to apply to manufacturing. That expression of an information process should receive copyright protection, with required fair dealing and other exceptions for things such as interfaces, not patent protection. --- Russell McOrmond, Internet Consultant: <http://www.flora.ca/> Governance software that controls ICT, automates government policy, or electronically counts votes, shouldn't be bought any more than politicians should be bought. -- http://www.flora.ca/russell/ -- For (un)subscription information, posting guidelines and links to other related sites please see http://www.digital-copyright.ca Read: [next] [previous] message List: [newer] [older] articles You need to subscribe to post to this forum. |